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26 July 1955

Leon Moore, Esq.  
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Dear Leon:

Many thanks for your letter of 29 June which I have read with the greatest interest and have shared with my associates.

I hope to get away about the middle of August and am looking forward to seeing you in Europe.

Sincerely,

*signed A. W. Dulles*

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June 29, 1955

Dear Allen,

I would like to write you some remarks about present Soviet foreign policy.

1. The first indications of the new Soviet slogan for "peaceful coexistence" with the outside world appeared immediately after Stalin's death. However, only the final decision about West German rearmament and the new situation in Asia transformed these indications into full reality.

2. After the last war it looked like the center of gravity of future war or peace moved from Europe to Asia. Such shift, which initially probably appealed to Moscow, involved in the final analysis a lot of Russian losses and responsibilities without giving them any advantages.

The victory of the Chinese Communists forced Russia to give up practically all important acquisitions in Asia obtained as a result of the last war (Manchuria, Port Arthur, Darien, etc.). Probably Russia also lost to their "Chinese brothers" the territories like Sing King which the Soviet controlled for at least 30 years. I believe Stalin foresaw it and was reluctant to go all the way to secure a full victory of the Mao regime. Stalin probably was quite unhappy that this country tolerated such victory - he preferred a divided, fighting, weak China. Now the Russians must "faire bonne mine a mauvais jeu": the apparition of the Chinese Communist state forced Moscow to return all former Chinese territories, committed Russia to eventual complications in Asia in which Moscow is not interested, cannot control them or obtain any gains. Furthermore, the isolation of Communist China put exclusively on Russia the heavy burden of enormous economic help to China.

Whatever happens in future Communist aggression in Asia, Russia has to bear an important part of the consequences without gaining an inch of territory for themselves.

This special situation and its implications should not be overlooked. The Communist theoretical basis of internationalism ("the Communist nations remain national in appearance but international in substance") was substantially watered before, during and after the last war by strong nationalism. Today China and Yugoslavia and, even, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Rumania will never become simple constituents of the Soviet Union, which would have been the case under classic Leninism. The existence of separate national entities, based internally on Communist doctrine (often differently interpreted and applied in countries like Yugoslavia, China, Russia etc.) created interstate contradictions which, in spite of Communist "solidarity" must grow and eventually clash in one or another form.

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The right evaluation of these contradictory tendencies should be the basis of a constructive foreign policy - they are, without doubt, the moving force for changes in the present Russian policy.

3. The German rearmament and new conception of modern warfare also influenced the changes in Russian European policy. It is an accepted fact that the Nazis nearly won the Russian war and only American supplies, the bombing of Germany, landing in Africa and Italy and Hitler's stupid policy towards the population of occupied Russian territories changed the defeat into a victory.

This is well remembered by the Soviet leading group who also realize that overwhelming superiority in the land forces may not be a decisive factor in modern, future war. As things stand today, Russia is still behind in the development of atomic weapons and reached only limited possibilities for a sneak attack on this country. At the same time she is exposed to decisive retaliation from nearby located bases. To bring their atom, hydrogen and aviation forces to U.S. levels, Russia needs either a lot of time under very favorable circumstances, or an effective (for the Allies) agreement outlawing the use of atomic weapons. The elimination of the use of atom bombing only would not probably solve the Russian problem. They need to get the elimination of all atomic weapons which transformed military numeric superiority into a secondary advantage.

I do not think that the Russians seriously believe in the possibility of substantial disarmaments, but they may go far in order to get what they want.

Consequently, Moscow pursues three goals:

- a) to win the maximum of time in order to reach atomic and aviation superiority either for an eventual sneak attack on the U.S. or for a decisive shift in balance of power;
- b) to try, meanwhile, to reach whatever possible agreement in outlawing atomic weapons which would be fully binding on the Allies and difficult to enforce on the Russians;
- c) to continue their efforts to divide the Western Allies with special emphasis on France and Germany, making full use of French fear of German rearmament and of German desire for unification; (Moscow more likely would sacrifice the East German Communist regime if they could obtain a real neutralization of Germany.)
- d) to ~~make~~ use of propagandistic advantages deriving from the present course of Soviet policy.

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Such a course of "friendly coexistence" is also due to permanent Soviet internal economic difficulties and to increasing complications in ruling satellite countries. The policy of cold war was harmful to the Soviet Union more than to anyone else. This was clear even in Stalin's time but nobody in the Politbureau dared to say anything. Now with collective leadership in the Politbureau, certainly free discussion and exchange of views take place. Under these circumstances a repetition of the mistakes characteristic of the last years of the aged and stubborn dictator is hardly possible.

Logical reasoning and moderation are, in my opinion, predominant in the present Russian foreign policy. The elimination of a one-man dictatorship made the unforeseen and unpredictable in this policy rather improbable.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Leon Moore

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